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The paper analyzes the financial crisis of through the lens of market failures and regulatory 
failures. We present a case that there were four primary failures contributing to the crisis: 
excessive risk-taking in the financial sector due to mispriced government guarantees; 
regulatory focus on individual institution risk rather than systemic risk; opacity of positions in 
financial derivatives that produced externalities from individual firm failures; and runs on the 
unregulated banking sector that eventually threatened to bring down the entire financial 
sector. In emphasizing the role of regulatory failures, we provide a description of regulatory 
evolution in response to the panic of 1907 and the Great Depression, why the regulation put 
in place then was successful in addressing market failures, but how, over time, especially 
around the resolutions of Continental Illinois, Savings and Loans crisis and Long-Term 
Capital Management, expectations of too-big-to-fail status got anchored. We propose 
specific reforms to address the four market and regulatory failures we identify, and we 
conclude with some lessons for emerging markets. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The severity of the financial crisis of has forced academics, regulators and policymakers to 
rethink the contours of the current financial system. Calls for the greatest regulatory overhaul 
since the Great Depression have become common. Indeed, many observers, including 
ourselves, view the crisis first and foremost as a regulatory failure and are convinced that 
the current regulatory architecture—the product of many ad hoc responses to prior crises 
and antiquated in the face of the evolving structure and role of financial institutions—is in 
need of repair. But regulation is a tricky business;  the law of unintended consequences 
always applies. The wrong decisions may well make future crises more likely and  more 
severe, while regulation that is too heavy handed could stifle future financial efficiency and 
innovation.  
While the current crisis has exposed multiple cracks in the financial system, the instinctive 
reaction of some is to call for a paradigm shift—even blaming the nature of capitalism itself. 
In reality, the problem is far less dramatic. A good rule of thumb for designing effective 
regulation is to focus almost exclusively on the specific source of the market failures and 
evaluate robust ways of addressing these failures through regulatory interventions.  
History can be a good guide here. Somewhat paradoxically, even though financial crises are 
rare, they are recurring phenomena, just like the business cycle. Thus it is possible to think 
about crises—and how to respond to them—in a systematic manner. What are the common 
causes of crises across their recurrences? Are there lessons to be learned from the crises of 
the past that can be helpful in the future? What responses to crises have been most 
successful? And based on these, what can be done next to try to improve stability without 
unduly undermining efficiency and innovation?  
One view of the financial crisis of  has been that it illustrates the failure of the market-driven 
view of economic activity. In this view, the past decades of liberalizing markets, removing 
regulatory restrictions, and trusting markets to discipline themselves have had the 
unintended consequence of destabilizing the financial system.  
A companion view is that one can best understand how markets act in terms of behavioral 
phenomena—like herd behavior—where market participants all move in the same direction 
in waves of pessimism and optimism. And indeed, if one had to describe market behavior in 
terms of bubbles and collapses, this turns out to be a very useful description. But there is an 
important distinction to be made between description and explanation. The notion of herd 
behavior or “animal spirits” carries with it little, if any, positive prescription for policy.  
A contrasting view is an analytical market-driven view that asks what the specific market 
failures were that led to the crisis, and paves the way for thinking about regulatory solutions 
that can address these failures. We argue in this essay that such an analytical view also 
provides a better positive explanation of the financial crisis. 
The set of institutions that today provide the architecture for the US financial system—the 
Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission—
all emerged over time in response to events, most often to past crises. Regulatory 
institutions that survive today exist because they turned out to be useful. They are seen to 
have contributed to the stability and growth of the US financial markets for many decades. 
There were many other institutions that did not meet this test, either because they were ill 
conceived from the beginning or because financial innovation rendered them obsolete.  
Today, there is a strong desire to reform the surviving institutions, and there is some 
urgency to do so because of the enormous costs to society associated with their manifest 
failure in the current financial crisis. In this chapter, we document the market failures that ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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characterized the recent financial crisis and then develop a sensible set of policy responses 
to reform the regulatory landscape.  
The first section of this discussion reviews some of the historical precedents, panics, and 
banking crises that led to the present financial and economic environment and that shaped 
the current regulatory system.  
The second section describes the recent financial crisis in terms of specific market failures 
as they relate to the following:  
—the excessive risk-taking incentives of financial institutions when government 
guarantees are not priced or are mispriced;  
—the regulatory focus on individual, rather than the systemic, risk of financial firms;  
—opacity of financial firms and markets that created externalities from failures of 
individual firms; and  
—the likelihood of “runs” in the shadow banking system, which relies heavily on 
uninsured short-term funding.  
In the third section, we lay out some principles of regulation that address these failures. 
Specifically, we propose the following regulation to address these issues: 
—Government guarantees in the system (for example, deposit insurance, too-big-
to-fail status, and implicit subsidies to hybrid financial intermediaries, such as the 
government-sponsored enterprises  (GSEs)  need to be priced to align the risk-
taking incentives of financial firms. 
—The systemic risk associated with actions of individual financial institutions needs 
to be priced, that is, firms need to be forced to internalize the costs of the negative 
externalities imposed by their actions on the system as a whole. 
—Arguably, the leading candidate for the bottleneck that emerged in the financial 
system was the over-the-counter (OTC) market for derivatives; we argue for much 
greater transparency in this market. 
—A key aspect of the crisis centered on runs in the wholesale funding markets 
(asset-backed commercial paper, repurchase agreements, unsecured commercial 
paper, and unsecured interbank lending). We argue for imposition of liquidity 
requirements for financial institutions that are similar in spirit to the way capital 
requirements are imposed.  
The last section  illustrates, through a series of examples, that these principles are as 
relevant for emerging markets as they are to the global wholesale markets.  
2.  LESSONS FROM PAST CRISES 
If one focuses for the moment on the United States (US) during the twentieth century, it may 
come as a surprise to find that it has suffered a number of significant financial crises. Among 
them were the Panic of 1907, a severe contraction in 1921, the banking panic of the 1930s 
and the Great Depression, the failure of the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company in 
1984, the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, and the Long-Term Capital Management 
crisis in 1998. We discuss several of these, in turn, to illustrate the relationship between 
market failure and financial regulation. 
Table 1 provides a summary of our discussion. In brief, we argue that the financial regulation 
of the 1930s was successful to the extent that it addressed the main sources of market 
failure at the time, namely, uncertainty about which institutions were insolvent. Financial 
crises began to recur in the 1980s. In contrast to the 1930s, however, the problems that 
arose in the more recent period—runs in the wholesale funding market, excessive risk 
shifting, and legal barriers to winding down institutions—were not repaired by regulatory ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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responses. In hindsight, some of these regulatory failures sowed the seeds for the crisis of 
today, just  as poor regulatory responses today could likely sow the seeds of crises 
tomorrow. 
Table 1: Description of Five Financial Crises in the United States during the  
Twentieth Century
a 
Crisis  Event  Market failure  Solution  Success? 
Panic of 1907  Losses due to 
speculation; bank 








and lender of last 
resort 
Did not deal with 
uncertainty issue 
and thus bank 
runs 
Great Depression  Huge 
macroeconomic 
shock, caused 




insolvency led to 
massive runs 





Served well for 





Losses due to 
concentrated 
exposure, lost 
access to funding 
Relied on 
wholesale, as 
opposed to retail, 
funding 
Bailout and 












system due to 
risk shifting on 







Bailout and the 






collected due to 
funds being well 
capitalized 
LTCM (1998)  Large hedge 









       
Note: a. Abbreviations: LCFI, large complex financial institutions; LTCM, Long-Term Capital Management; TBTF, too 
 big to fail. 
Source: Authors. 
       
2.1  Lesson 1: The Panic of 1907 
The Panic of 1907 was triggered in the “curbside” stock market that was organized outside 
of the formal confines of the New York Stock Exchange.
1
                                                 
1 The best recent account of this episode is Bruner and Carr (2007). 
 Investors tried to corner the market 
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of United Copper plummeted. The same investors were also heavily involved with a number 
of banks and brokerages. When the United Copper play collapsed, it raised concerns about 
the safety of the banks that had lent money to back their scheme. The panic spread and led 
to pressure on other banks, forcing a number of banks to close their doors and suspend 
operations.  
The problem that faced the banks and financial markets more broadly was  the inherent 
contradiction of fractional reserve banking. All of the institutions involved in the panic were 
engaged in intermediation of one form or another, with less than 100%  reserves. When 
depositors became concerned and demanded their money back, even solvent financial 
institutions found their cash and gold reserves insufficient to meet demand. Drained of cash, 
they were forced to shut their doors. The institutions that had evolved endogenously  to 
address the problems of temporary liquidity shortages  were bank clearing house 
associations that pooled resources to provide liquidity in times of stress and performed many 
of the functions of a central bank.
2
There are many important lessons to be derived from the Panic of 1907. First, fractional 
reserve banking is inherently precarious. Second, information on solvency (or lack thereof) 
of financial institutions is incredibly valuable but extremely difficult to gather, and at the time, 
no institution existed to provide it. Finally, a lender of last resort for solvent but illiquid 
institutions is needed for financial stability, but the private provision of that liquidity through 
the clearing house associations was ineffective when it was most needed. 
 However, two problems emerged in the Panic of 1907. 
The first was that private clearing house associations also faced the risk of default. The 
second was that some companies, notably the trust companies in  New York, were not 
allowed to be members of the clearing  house  association due to the internecine rivalry 
between commercial banks and trust companies. 
In May 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich Vreeland Act that created something called the 
National Monetary Commission, chaired by Senator Nelson Aldrich, whose mission was to 
study the underlying causes of the Panic  of 1907 and develop proposals to make such 
events less likely in the future. The final report of the National Monetary Commission was 
published on January 11, 1911. For nearly two years, legislators debated the proposal, and 
it was not until December 22, 1913, that Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act. The bill 
was signed by President Woodrow Wilson on December 22, 1913, creating the Federal 
Reserve System. 
The Federal Reserve has evolved over time and periodically has been severely challenged, 
notably in the 1930s and in the crisis of 2007–2009. But it has quite successfully served one 
of the critical purposes for which it was created, that is, the need for a credible lender of last 
resort facility. This was only a partial solution, however, since it failed to resolve the 
information problem of consumers who had to decide whether or not to join a run on a bank 
in the first place. It took the banking panics of the 1930s to focus additional attention on 
sources of instability other than illiquidity. 
2.2  Lesson 2: The Banking Panics of the 1930s 
There were three separate waves of banking panics during the 1930s—in 1930, 1931, and 
early 1933. The economic forces at work in creating and perpetuating the Great Depression 
have been much discussed and debated. We will not repeat those issues here except to 
note that there is a general consensus that the contractionary monetary policies that the 
Federal Reserve Board pursued at the time were a contributing factor to the banking crisis of 
the early 1930s.
3
                                                 
2 See Gorton (1985). 
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The prices of goods and services in the US fell by approximately 25% between 1929 and 
1933. This led to debt deflation, a phenomenon by which the collateral underlying loans 
shrink in value, causing the real burden of debt to rise and leading the economy to spiral 
further downward. In a parallel with the recent financial crisis, the collapse of the real estate 
bubble in the second half of the 1920s was arguably a factor contributing to the 1929 stock 
market crash and added materially to the solvency stresses imposed on the banks. The debt 
deflation of 1929–33 and the contemporaneous soaring of unemployment rates made it 
extremely difficult for homeowners to repay their debts. As borrowers were increasingly 
unable to make their payments, the underlying value of banks’ assets fell, many banks were 
unable to meet the needs of their depositors, listed bank stocks plummeted, and a lack of 
confidence in the remaining banks led to a general state of panic (Bernanke 2000).  
By March 1933, as Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, there was a full-fledged banking panic 
and cries for reform of the banking system. The responses to those pressures could have 
been many, for example, nationalizing the banks or relaxing restrictions on bank mergers or 
interstate banking (and the latter would have led to a highly concentrated banking system)—
all of them solutions that had been adopted elsewhere and all actively debated at the time. 
The immediate response to the panic was to declare a “bank holiday” in order to determine, 
as had been the case in 1907, whether individual banks were solvent, illiquid, or liquid 
enough to reopen. This helped to calm the system but only restored the status quo of the 
post-1907 world. The fundamental market failure still existed. Banks made money by 
engaging in risky intermediation. Consumers had no easy way of assessing that risk, leaving 
intact the possibility of panics and bank runs.  
The policy innovation that addressed this problem was the Banking Act of 1933, which 
created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to provide credible government 
insurance for individual bank deposits and which effectively dealt with the problem of retail 
bank runs. The Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act separated investment banks 
from commercial banks, in an effort to insulate depositors’ savings from being used to 
finance high-risk investments in the financial markets. Firms that already engaged in both 
commercial and investment banking activities, such as the J.P. Morgan Bank, were forced to 
break up into commercial banks (in this case, what became the Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York) and investment banks (in this case, Morgan Stanley and Company). 
The Banking Act  further stipulated that interest not be paid on demand deposits in 
commercial banks; those seeking returns would have to use less liquid savings deposits or 
securities.  
The creation of the FDIC was arguably the most successful policy response to the banking 
crisis of the 1930s. In fact, the FDIC resulted from an amendment to the Banking Act of 
1933, and had been opposed by President Franklin Roosevelt and many leading bankers in 
the big US money centers. Nevertheless, this one institutional innovation was responsible for 
calming the fears of depositors and ending retail bank runs. Its creation was followed by 
many decades of relative stability in the financial system.  
The Banking Act of 1933 required that all banks that were members of the Federal Reserve 
System have their deposits insured, up to a monetary limit, by the FDIC. Nonmember banks 
could also be covered, subject to approval by the insurer. Insured banks were required to 
pay premiums covering their insurance, based on their deposit size. Within six months of the 
creation of the FDIC, 97% of all commercial bank deposits were covered by insurance. 
The FDIC has been a highly successful institution because it solved a well-defined problem: 
uncertainty about the solvency of the banks among retail depositors. More important, it did 
so in a way that acknowledged the contradictions and risks inherent in fractional reserve 
banking by making those responsible for managing the risks—the banks themselves—pay 
for insuring against them. These costs were passed  through to bank borrowers, time 
depositors, and investors. Judged by the results, this was a remarkably successful piece of ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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regulation. It stabilized the industry. Bank runs disappeared, and the number of bank failures 
dropped to an extremely low level compared with prior decades.  
The other important regulatory innovation of the 1930s comprised the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The main intention of this legislation was to 
ensure that investors receive significant (or “material”) information concerning securities 
being offered for public sale and to redress market misbehavior. The objective was to “shine 
a bright light” on financial information so that investors could make informed decisions. To 
underscore the need for reliable information, the 1933 and 1934 acts required that public 
financial information be verified by independent auditors using standardized accounting 
rules. These rules gave a major boost to the efficiency and transparency of financial 
markets, and deserve much credit for stimulating the flow of capital in the US economy. 
The important thing to note about both of these seminal regulatory innovations is that they 
were not attacks on the free market or on capitalism—something that could not be taken for 
granted since, at the time, the spread of socialism and communism was gaining momentum, 
and other options might well have seemed appealing. What these reforms recognized was 
the need for information and confidence to make the markets function better. These were 
attributes that only public policy could require of market participants and then provide to 
markets at large. The regulatory reforms also constituted a bet on the decision making of the 
individual investor. Given enough transparency, investors were believed capable of making 
smart and profitable long-term decisions. These were intelligent, effective pro-market 
regulations that worked well for many decades.  
2.3  Lesson 3: Continental Illinois and Too-Big-To-Fail Status 
From the 1930s until the 1980s, the US banking system functioned fairly smoothly.
4
There were bank failures to be sure, but the FDIC had a well-tested approach to the 
problem. When failure was unavoidable, the regulatory machinery worked as designed: 
either the regulators sold the bank successfully (“purchase and assumption”),  or they 
liquidated the institution, made good on deposit insurance promises, and wiped out the 
uninsured depositors and other creditors. This set of procedures imposed a discipline on the 
banking system that seemed to work very well. 
 The 
lessons learned in the early part of the twentieth century and the institutions created to deal 
with the fundamental market failures and information frictions—the Fed, the FDIC, and the 
SEC (bolstered by the Investment Company Act of 1940)—led to a long period of relative 
tranquility in banking and financial markets. Bank failures slowed to a trickle as bank 
regulation focused on maintaining adequate capital and controlling risk.  
In 1982, however, federal regulators decided to close the Oklahoma-based Penn Square 
Bank, a US$436-million institution that specialized in oil and gas sector loans. Penn Square 
originated large volumes of loans to the historically risky exploration sector of the US energy 
industry, which began to suffer as energy prices fell in the recession of the early 1980s. The 
seventh-largest bank in the US, Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company, had invested 
aggressively alongside or through Penn Square and booked a large volume of Penn 
Square–originated loans. Continental Illinois had made many other loans to the energy 
sector and, at the same time, had expanded its lending to developing countries to help them 
finance debts incurred in the energy crises of the 1970s. In 1982 Mexico was forced to 
renegotiate its debt, triggering the less-developed-country debt crisis involving hundreds of 
bank loan syndications.  
While many other US  commercial banks followed the same lending strategy in the late 
1970s, Continental Illinois’s credit exposures were compounded by a funding strategy that 
was unusual at the time. Traditionally, banks funded growth in their lending activities by 
                                                 
4 The following discussion about Continental Illinois relies heavily on FDIC (1997). ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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attracting larger volumes of savings from retail depositors. Continental Illinois, however, had 
a limited retail presence, due in part to federal and local banking regulations that limited the 
number of banking outlets it was permitted to have. Consequently, Continental Illinois 
depended heavily on funding itself in the wholesale money markets. Indeed, by 1981 it was 
sourcing most of its funding through federal funds and by selling short-term certificates of 
deposit on the wholesale money markets. Only 20% of Continental Illinois’s funding came 
from traditional retail deposits in Chicago. 
Continental Illinois had pursued an aggressive growth strategy and had assumed a great 
deal of concentrated risk. When the energy sector turned sour and the less  developed 
countries  rescheduled, Continental Illinois was unusually vulnerable to the views of  the 
wholesale funding markets. In 1984 investors and creditors lost confidence in the bank, and 
in a precursor to the crisis of 2007–08, Continental Illinois was quickly shut out of its usual 
sources of funding in the domestic and Eurodollar markets.  
In May 1984, Continental Illinois experienced what the FDIC described as a high-speed 
electronic bank run. To stem the panic, regulatory agencies and the banking industry 
arranged billions of dollars in emergency funding for the bank. The fear was that a failure of 
Continental Illinois would undermine the entire banking system. More than 2,300 banks had 
correspondent accounts with Continental Illinois. Unlike the uninsured retail depositor runs of 
the 1930s, this time it was an uninsured wholesale depositor run. In an extremely 
controversial decision, the FDIC tried to stop the run by extending its guarantee beyond its 
retail deposit limits to cover uninsured depositors and creditors, as well. This was the 
beginning of the notion that some banks should be considered too big (or too 
interconnected) to fail.  
The FDIC’s emergency help was followed by a package of permanent measures, making 
Continental Illinois the largest bank in US banking history to be rescued by government 
agencies. Unable to find a takeover partner, the FDIC ended up owning more than 80% of 
the bank. The Continental Illinois board was replaced, senior management was fired, the 
bank was restructured and later floated in a public offering, and subsequently was acquired 
by Bank of America. The FDIC’s share of the bill to rescue Continental Illinois was later 
calculated to be US$1.1 billion.
 
The Continental Illinois story provides a classic example of how a sharp drop in confidence 
can lead counterparties in the wholesale markets suddenly to withdraw funding from a 
wounded bank, spinning the institution into a liquidity crisis as potentially fatal as any 
nineteenth-century run on a bank by retail depositors—in this case, a liquidity crisis triggered 
by a suspected insolvency problem that turned out to be true. 
It should have been a warning call that systemic risk can build up quickly in a credit 
expansion cycle and needs to be appropriately priced and regulated. But that was not to be. 
Continental Illinois should have been the canary in the coal mine. It demonstrated that the 
regulatory system crafted in the 1930s needed updating to account for the development of 
massive wholesale banking markets. Instead, and despite many warning voices, the 
problem was ignored.  
2.4  Lesson 4: The Savings and Loan Crisis 
The most serious postwar crisis in the US banking sector was the savings and loan (S&L) 
crisis of the late 1980s. It is often blamed (with at least some justification) on the more lax 
regulatory environment that evolved during the Reagan administration.
5
                                                 
5 White (1991). 
 That is not the entire 
story, however, and the S&L crisis remains an episode that contains valuable lessons for the 
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Savings and loan institutions, as distinct from commercial banks, were another product of 
the Great Depression. They were created to serve the public policy goal of encouraging 
home ownership. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 created the Federal Home 
Loan Bank System to provide liquidity and low-cost financing for S&Ls. There were twelve 
regional  Home Loan Banks; these were owned by their members and were under the 
supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The National Housing Act of 
1934 created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to provide 
federal deposit insurance for S&Ls, similar to what the FDIC provided for commercial banks. 
In contrast to the FDIC, which was established as an independent agency, the FSLIC was 
placed under the authority of the FHLBB. In retrospect, the FHLBB carried far heavier 
political baggage than did the FDIC. 
For decades, the FHLBB’s examination, supervision,  and regulatory capabilities were 
relatively poorly developed, in part because S&Ls had a narrowly defined financial 
intermediation role and not much scope for expanding it. S&Ls took in savings on which they 
paid low interest rates and lent the money at marginally higher interest rates on thirty-year 
fixed-rate mortgages. This model all began to change with the accelerating inflation of the 
1970s, when interest rates soared. S&L deposits began to flee in pursuit of higher returns, 
and even when Congress lifted caps on deposit rates, the S&Ls were still being squeezed 
on the other end by their legacy portfolios of thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages. It was a classic 
maturity mismatch. They needed to find other sources of income. 
In response, the FHLBB began loosening its regulations. It allowed the thrifts to begin 
issuing adjustable-rate mortgages. Congress also encouraged diversification and explicitly 
authorized the thrifts to engage in consumer lending and investments in commercial real 
estate. Accordingly, both federal and state thrift regulators began relaxing restrictions on the 
their asset allocation options, easing safety and soundness regulation, lowering capital 
requirements, and changing accounting rules to make it easier for S&Ls to meet their net 
worth requirements. All of these changes helped the thrift industry to grow dramatically. 
Between 1980 and 1986, 492 new thrifts were chartered in the US. Taken together, it was a 
recipe for disaster. 
Things began to change when inflation was brought under control early in the Reagan 
administration, and a major recession took hold. Oil prices fell to levels that made many 
earlier investments unprofitable. An array of tax benefits for real estate investments was 
eliminated, and that made many earlier projects unprofitable. Much of the banking growth 
between 1983 and 1985 had been in commercial real estate lending. 
By 1985 it had become clear that the thrift industry faced serious trouble. Enough S&Ls had 
folded or were in danger of folding that the FSLIC was insolvent. Efforts to recapitalize the 
FSLIC in 1986 and 1987 were bitterly opposed by the industry, which lobbied aggressively 
with members of Congress. Thrift failures increased during 1987 and into 1988, but the 
insolvency of the FSLIC meant that rescuing troubled thrifts would cost more than the FSLIC 
had available in its insurance fund. As a result, the regulators could not intervene in S&Ls 
that had more in liabilities than assets. This left many insolvent thrifts still in business. These 
“zombie” banks had incentives to take even greater risks in the hope that they could improve 
their outcomes, and many did so using an early version of brokered deposits by returns-
chasing clients who hoped to be bailed out if things went wrong.  
The crisis in the S&L industry was finally acknowledged and resolved after the inauguration 
of George H.W. Bush in 1989. Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989, which abolished the FHLBB and shifted regulation of S&Ls to 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), transferred the thrifts’ deposit insurance function from 
the FSLIC to the FDIC, and reinstituted many of the regulatory provisions that had been 
weakened during the previous decade. In turn, the 1989 reform act created the Resolution 
Trust Corporation to liquidate or restructure the insolvent S&Ls. ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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There are several lessons to be learned from the S&L mess. The first is that when regulatory 
institutions have outlived their usefulness or have been rendered obsolete by market 
developments, it is not enough just to eliminate the boundaries without consideration of the 
risks that are being created. This was the case with the thrift industry, which had been 
created and developed with specific goals in mind. 
Another lesson is that regulators can easily be captured by the industry they regulate. This 
was clearly the case with FHLBB. The S&L crisis reinforces the point that moral hazard is an 
important and ever-present issue. It is critical to close insolvent, insured financial institutions 
promptly in order to minimize potential losses to the deposit insurance fund (or the taxpayer, 
in general) and to ensure a more efficient financial marketplace—zombie financial 
intermediaries extract a heavy price on financial market efficiency. Finally, resolution of 
failing financial institutions requires that the deposit insurance fund be strongly capitalized 
with reserves based on real risk assessments. 
2.5  Lesson 5: Long-Term Capital Management 
An episode that deserves mention in any litany of financial crises is the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM), the  storied hedge fund that had grown so quickly 
between 1994 and 1998, and was so interconnected that it was thought to be a systemically 
risky institution. 
In 1998 LTCM collapsed in a “liquidity event.” A  sudden disappearance of liquidity from 
credit markets—associated with a Russian default on external debt on August 15, 1998—
triggered a global “flight to quality.” It is interesting to ponder why this enormous liquidity 
event did not lead to a global financial meltdown.  
As it became clear that the magnitude of LTCM’s liquidity problem was enormous and that 
unwinding its positions could put severe strains on financial markets, the president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with Alan Greenspan’s blessing, called a meeting of all 
of LTCM’s major banks and prime brokers to get them to work on a cooperative solution to 
the problem. Reluctant banks were forcibly dragged into the workout. That is the formula that 
the Fed and US Treasury were trying to reprise on the fateful weekend in October 2008 
when they met to discuss the fate of Lehman Brothers. In 1998 what they did worked. There 
was an orderly insolvency and dissolution of LTCM without undue harm to the markets or 
the banks most directly involved.  
The resolution of LTCM and the unwinding of its complicated positions were orderly because 
they were carried out by LTCM itself with the support of the other major financial firms and 
the New York Fed. The lessons of the LTCM collapse were clearly articulated in a 1999 
report entitled “Hedge Funds, Leverage and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital 
Management.”
6
One lesson the report clearly delivers is that procedures for unwinding complicated systemic 
firms needed urgent attention. The report devotes an entire appendix to a discussion of the 
inconsistencies in the US Bankruptcy Code that interfered with a private market resolution of 
LTCM’s debt problems and derivatives contracts. It describes the extent to which existing 
bankruptcy procedures are not, in fact, conducive to private market solutions in complex 
situations involving both standard loan contracts and derivatives contracts. These were 
clearly failings that needed to be fixed.  
 It was  signed by Robert Rubin, Alan Greenspan, Arthur Levitt, and 
Brooksley Born.  
The key LTCM lesson was that better mechanisms were needed for the resolution of large, 
systemic firms. Absent that, and absent methods for penalizing institutions for accumulating 
systemic risk, the system  would be stuck with firms that are both too big and too 
interconnected to fail and to resolve at acceptable cost to the public. Unfortunately, 
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regulators believed that hedge funds might be the type of firm  to get into trouble in a 
financial crisis; but in the crisis of 2007–2009, it turned out to be investment banks and 
universal banks themselves, many of which were, in fact, running “in-house” hedge funds. 
3.  MARKET FAILURES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF  
Financial crises have many common features. In the background real economy, there is 
usually the presence of an asset price “bubble” (or asset price inflation, for purists), a 
corresponding credit boom, and large capital inflows into that economy.
7
As described in the preceding section, the banking acts of the 1930s solved the uncertainty 
problem that led to bank runs by providing deposit insurance through the creation of the 
FDIC. Depositors no longer had to run on insured banks because the government 
guaranteed deposits up to certain maximums. Of course, it was well understood that deposit 
insurance creates moral hazard—that is, an incentive for banks to undertake greater risk 
than they would otherwise without the insurance. Regulators and policymakers understood 
that deposit insurance could lead to excessive risk taking, so they set up a number of 
counteracting barriers: 
 However, these 
characteristics are necessary but not sufficient for a financial crisis to develop. The severity 
of the crisis depends crucially on the underlying financial sector’s exposure to these 
conditions and, in fact, the overall market’s uncertainty about the financial sector’s exposure 
to them. A key role of financial regulation is to put limits on financial institutions so as to limit 
this exposure. While there are many reasons for the relative calm of the US financial system 
during the fifty years after the Great Depression, many analysts continue to give credit to the 
financial regulation that was enacted at that time.  
—Banks would have to pay to be part of the deposit insurance system. So, at 
least, on an ex ante basis, regulators took into account the cost of the 
insurance. Deposit insurance was limited in magnitude per account, thus 
restricting the size of the banks. 
—The risk-taking activities of banks were ring fenced to the extent that there 
was a separation of the commercial and, presumably more risky, investment 
banking activities. 
—Enhanced supervision and winding-down provisions for individual banks, 
generally centered on required minimum capital requirements, which served as 
a buffer against the risk-shifting incentive arising from deposit insurance. 
So what happened in the 1980s that kept deposit insurance but took away these 
protections? 
There is considerable debate about this issue, but the general consensus is that 
technological and other innovations changed the nature of banking—and therefore 
competition—in the financial sector.
8
Keeley (1990) used the increase in bank competition as an explanation for the S&L crisis 
described earlier. Prior to these technological changes, banks and thrifts enjoyed 
monopolistic advantages so that their bank charters had “franchise value.” But once this 
 Some of these innovations included the development 
of the automated teller machine,  which  reduced geographic ties between banks and 
depositors; the proliferation of money market funds and cash management accounts by 
broker-dealers and asset managers outside the banking system; and an increase in the 
types of communication channels, further reducing the ties between local bankers and 
depositors. In other words, the traditional lines of business of banks no longer enjoyed their 
previously protected status.  
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disappeared, the value to risk shifting and exploiting the guarantees of deposit insurance 
increased. In general, there is ample evidence of risk  shifting related to deregulation, 
stepped-up banking competition, and the S&L crisis.
9
Around the same time, the institutional side of banking also changed dramatically. There 
was tremendous growth in the so-called shadow banking system—that is,  financial 
institutions outside the traditional banking system that provide very similar services.
 
10 The 
shadow banking system includes derivatives—futures, options, swaps, repurchase 
agreements, and money market funds—securitization of loans in the mortgage, corporate, 
and household sectors, and an increasing emphasis on public equity and bond markets. As 
an illustration, the amount of assets of the financial sector held by depository institutions 
dropped from 60% in 1950 to less than 30% in 2006.
11
Kroszner and Melick (2009) provide a description of two financial systems, one being the 
traditional model of banking, the other a modern version of banking.
  
12
In the new model, the same individual now provides funds to a money market fund. This 
fund buys commercial paper issued by a special purpose vehicle of the bank backed by 
asset-backed securities. These asset-backed securities are  made up of the same loans 
described above in the old model of banking. The money market fund rolls over the 
commercial paper periodically as it becomes due. In the overwhelming majority of the cases, 
the credit risk of the loans underlying the asset-backed securities had embedded recourse 
back to the banks (effectively “securitization without risk transfer”).
 In the old model, an 
individual deposits funds in a bank. The bank then uses these funds to lend to corporations 
or individuals. The bank pays interest on the short-term deposits using interest earned on 
the loans. Concern over the funding mismatch and potential solvency issues of the bank are 
addressed through the bank’s asset-liability management process and the individual’s 
deposits being insured. This insurance, however, comes at a cost, both in terms of 
premiums paid, restrictions on the bank’s actions, and the requirement that a fraction of the 
funds be held as capital. 
13
Yet the risk-sharing mechanics and pricing are quite different. The rate offered by money 
market funds is invariably higher than that for equally liquid funds at checking and savings 
accounts of banks. Are these higher rates due to greater efficiency? Or are the rate 
differentials due to credit risk and the lack of “deposit-like” insurance? Or are the rates due 
to implicit government guarantees in a framework in which these guarantees are not priced, 
bank actions are much less restricted, and at most, only one-tenth the capital is required for 
off-balance-sheet financing via the special purpose vehicles? One set of arguments focuses 
on efficiency (welfare gains), and the other set of arguments focuses on risk  shifting 
(inefficient wealth transfers). 
 On the surface, this 
means that the economics underlying these two banking models are almost identical.  
Taking this background into account, we now describe the four market failures that we 
believe triggered and amplified the financial crisis of . 
3.1  Risk-Taking Incentives of Financial Institutions  
Given their inherently high leverage and the ease with which the risk profile of financial 
assets can be altered, banks and financial institutions have incentives to take on excessive 
risks. Ordinarily, market mechanisms would be expected to price risks correctly and thereby 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990); Cordell, MacDonald, and Wohar (1993); Kroszner and 
Strahan (1996); Hovakimian and Kane (2000). 
10 Gorton (2009). 
11 Kroszner and Melick (2009). 
12 See also Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2009); Gorton (2009). 
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ensure that risk taking in the economy is at efficient levels. However, there are two factors 
that have impeded such efficient outcomes. 
First, with the repeal of most protections from the Banking Act of the 1933, the only 
remaining protection against risk  shifting is capital requirements. If the guarantees are 
mispriced, financial firms have an incentive to skirt capital requirements and take excessive 
risk. One way of telling the story of the  crisis is that financial institutions managed to exploit 
loopholes in the regulatory system and built up large amounts of tail risk on the economy, 
particularly tied to residential real estate, with little or no underlying capital. 
The second mechanism that induces excessive risk  taking is a failure of corporate 
governance involving shareholders and employees. The fact that financial institutions have 
become large and increasingly complex and opaque in their activities has weakened 
external governance that operates through capital markets (accurate prices), the market for 
corporate control (takeovers),  and boards. Coincident with this, and to some extent a 
corollary to it, has been the fact that financial risks at these institutions are now increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a few “high-performance” profit-risk centers, which have an 
incentive to produce short-run imaginary profits at the expense of long-term risks (that is, 
“fake alpha”). 
At this point, we concentrate on what we consider to be the primary factor associated with 
the financial crisis, namely, the accordance of the numerous government guarantees in the 
system—most notably deposit insurance, the implicit guarantee of “too big to fail” (TBTF), 
and the “subsidies” provided to government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. Together, these imply that the vast majority of liabilities in the US financial 
system were subject to some form of safety net, with profound implications for efficiency in 
capital allocation, incentives, and the structure of financial intermediation. 
At the same time, it is important to note that the fact that banks received “free” or 
underpriced government insurance does not necessarily imply excess risk taking on their 
part. If the franchise value of their enterprise exceeds the benefits to risk shifting, then there 
might be very little effect associated with moral hazard from the insurance. The possibility of 
material shareholder losses, and the limits imposed on banks via Glass-Steagall, did 
contribute to relative calm for fifty or so years after the 1930s. However, once the Glass-
Steagall separation between commercial and investment banking was lifted (steadily since 
1970s), and competition dramatically increased (within and across states in the US as well 
as globally), the only real protection for the financial system came from adequate capital 
requirements. 
There were two consequences resulting from increased competition and the erosion of 
profits underlying the traditional lines of business of banks. First, it meant banks increasingly 
moved into businesses highlighting noninterest income, such as trading and fees. Second, 
and more important, it increased the relative value of risk shifting, since bank charter values 
had been eroded by deregulation. Because mispriced guarantees had effectively removed 
the market discipline component of governance normally reserved for creditors, risk shifting 
was particularly easy to do. 
In the crisis of 2007–2009, financial firms managed to shift risk by exploiting loopholes in 
regulatory capital requirements to take an undercapitalized,  US$2-  to 3-trillion,  highly 
leveraged, one-way  asymmetric bet on the economy, particularly tied to residential real 
estate but also to commercial real estate and other consumer credit exposures. This bet was 
taken in four distinct ways.  
First, the banks funded their portfolios of risky loans via off-balance-sheet vehicles 
(structured investment vehicles and conduits). These vehicles required about one-tenth the 
amount of capital of the same exposures held on the balance sheet, yet in 95% of the cases, ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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the credit risk effectively had full recourse back to the sponsoring institutions.
14
Second, financial institutions bought “underpriced” protection from monoline insurers and 
AIG, in the sense that banks were able to pocket the difference between the spread on the 
AAA  tranches of the securitization instruments and the monolines’ premiums. Because 
neither AIG nor the monolines had much capital backing this insurance, and certainly not 
enough in a systemic crisis, the risk again was effectively recourse back to the financial 
institutions through the counterparty risk of the insurers. 
 Acharya and 
others  (2010, figure 3.7) provide evidence of the remarkable growth in asset-backed 
commercial paper in the precrisis period. 
Third, financial institutions made outright purchases of AAA tranches of nonprime securities, 
which were treated as having low credit risk and zero liquidity and funding risk. Together, the 
broker-dealers, the GSEs, and the banks held more than half of the US$1.6 trillion of these 
securities outstanding.
15
Table 2: Holdings of Mortgage-Related Debt by Financial Institutions, 2007
a  
 Table 2 shows these holdings for financial institutions in 2007. This 
is the exact opposite of the key objective of securitization, in which the safest parts of credit 
risk are meant to be transferred from the financial sector to institutional investors and the 
capital markets at large.  
Billions of dollars, except as indicated 












CDOs  Total  Percent 
Banks and 
thrifts 




444  . . .  741  308  . . .  . . .  1,493  14 
Broker-dealers  . . .  . . .  49  100  130  24  303  3 
Financial 
guarantors 
. . .  62    . . .     . . .  100  . . .  162  2 
Insurance 
companies 
. . .  . . .  856  125  65  24  1,070  10 
Overseas  . . .  . . .  689  413  45  24  1,172  11 
Other  461  185  1,175  307  46  49  2,268  21 
  Total  2,925  1,116  4,362  1,636  476  121  10,680  . . . 
  Percent  27  10  41  15  4  1  . . .  . . . 
Note: 
a. Abbreviations: CDOs, collateralized debt obligations; HELOC, home equity line of credit; MBSs, mortgage-
backed securities. 
Source: Krishnamurthy (2008). 
Fourth, in August 2004, investment banks successfully lobbied the SEC to amend the net 
capitalization rule of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This amendment allowed a 
voluntary method of computing deductions to net capital for large broker-dealers. It permitted 
the investment banks to use internal models to calculate net capital requirements to market 
risk and derivative-related credit risk, placing them on an equal competitive footing with 
universal banks of Europe operating under the Basel II Accord. The net impact was 
essentially to double the leverage applied by investment banks. 
There is strong evidence in the literature for the existence of mispriced government 
guarantees and the consequences arising from these guarantees. In terms of the financial 
crisis of , how did these guarantees contribute to market failures? 
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With respect to deposit insurance, as described earlier, there is some consensus that moral 
hazard played an important role in both initiating and prolonging the S&L crisis. As a logical 
consequence, substantial reforms were enacted to address this issue, notably the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. One of the major changes in 
setting FDIC premiums was to make them more risk based. In theory, the FDIC assesses 
higher rates on those institutions that pose greater risks to the insurance fund. In practice, 
however, if the deposit insurance fund is well capitalized (that is, 1.25% of reserves to total 
insured deposits), no premiums are assessed to those banks considered to be of the lowest-
risk category. In fact, from 1996 to 2006, more than 90%  of all banks paid very little in 
deposit insurance premiums.
16
The S&L crisis implied the need for risk-based insurance premiums to be charged to banks. 
In what constitutes a significant regulatory failure, the risk-based method was not applied to 
the extent that 90%  of the banks fell in a single risk bucket, and indeed no insurance 
premiums at all were charged to the majority of US banks. This effectively meant that the US 
was running a free deposit insurance system with little or no protection at all at the time 
Glass-Steagall was repealed, and commercial banks were free to engage in all forms of 
investment banking and trading. 
 Acharya and others (2010, figure 2.1) illustrate this point by 
showing a reserve ratio close to 1.25% for this period and a small increase in fund balances. 
At first glance, the moral hazard inherent in depository institutions was limited in scope, 
since deposits were only a limited fraction of the assets (and liabilities) of the US financial 
system. However, since the majority of assets of the financial sector were held by a small 
number of large complex financial institutions (LCFIs),  the market discipline provided by 
liability holders can be considered notionally similar to that provided by depositors given the 
presumptive too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantee. Since the 1984 bailout of Continental Illinois 
(described in the first section), the TBTF issue had been much discussed in regulatory and 
academic circles.
17 Even before the financial crisis of 2007–2009 made the TBTF guarantee 
explicit, there was ample evidence that a TBTF policy was effectively in force and that it 
distorted market pricing for more than two decades before the onset of the crisis itself.
18
The case of the GSEs—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—illustrates the key importance of 
moral hazard and government guarantees. Fannie Mae was founded in 1938 in the wake of 
the Depression to provide liquidity and aid to the mortgage market. It became a government-
sponsored enterprise in 1968, and shortly after, Freddie Mac was formed to compete with 
Fannie Mae to create a more efficient secondary market for mortgages. Both were listed 
companies, with shares actively traded in the market. While not explicit and often denied, 
there was the presumption that both the guarantor function and debt of the GSEs had full 
backing of the US government. Fannie and Freddie shareholders could be wiped out under 
adverse circumstances, but their debt holders fully expected to be rescued at face value by 
the GSE relationship with the US  Treasury. Indeed, GSE debt generally was priced 
marginally above the prevailing treasury rate. US institutional investors (like pension funds) 
and foreign investors (like the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s central bank) were big 
players, chasing a few basis points of “free lunch” and fully expecting the implied Treasury 
Department backstop to kick in if times got tough. An excellent bet, as it turned out. 
 
Consider the investment function of the GSEs. For every  dollar  of mortgage-backed 
securities  (MBSs) purchased with equity, there was a large amount of debt issued to 
purchase additional MBSs.
19
                                                 
16 This issue was only partially addressed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 to the extent that 
the ratio of reserves to total deposits covered a wider range for which premiums would be collected. 
 The extraordinary point is the GSEs’ access to very high 
17 See Stern and Feldman (2004); Ennis and Malek (2005). 
18 See, for example, the empirical evidence in O’Hara and Shaw (1990); Penas and Unal (2004); Morgan and 
Stiroh (2005). 
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leverage, given that they were investing in risky mortgage securities with questionable 
liquidity. This provides an idea of the size of the implicit government guarantee. In fact, the 
empirical literature has quantified the transfer from the taxpayer to the GSEs’ bondholders 
and stockholders to be in many billions, even before the crisis ignited.
20
Furthermore, it has been well documented that the investment portfolio of the GSEs also 
became riskier through time, as both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to load up on 
nonprime mortgages—under intense pressure from both the Clinton administration (through 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development under Secretaries Henry Cisneros and 
Andrew Cuomo) and by Congress, to better serve the political end of housing affordability for 
lower-income Americans. Though the available data are sparse and somewhat 
controversial—with some analysts arguing that the nonprime bets were much larger—it is 




In their recent study, Acharya and others (2010, figure 2.3) illustrate the size of the GSE 
mortgage portfolios, noting the subprime holdings in the years immediately before the crisis. 
With the lack of market discipline from debt holders due to the government’s guarantee, one 
would expect that the GSEs would invest in riskier assets to the extent possible. It is 
therefore not surprising that as nonprime mortgages took off, the GSEs shifted risk toward 
these assets. As creditors did not price the risk exposures of GSEs,  given the implicit 
guarantee, and as equity holders allowed the risky bets to maximize their option value on the 
guarantee, the interests of effective claimants of GSEs—the taxpayers—were marginalized 
in the highly politicized corporate control environment of these public-private hybrid financial 
institutions. 
 In contrast to prime mortgages, however, they were not hedged using 
corresponding interest rate swaps, making them highly vulnerable.  
3.2  Systemic Risk of Financial Institutions 
Over the preceding two decades, there had been tremendous, sometimes unrecognized, 
growth in the systemic risk arising from failures of financial institutions (LTCM case, 
described in the first section, being the prime example). There is in essence a negative 
externality on the system because the systemic cost of a financial institution’s collapse—
which can lead to failures of others, the freezing of capital markets, or both—is not fully 
internalized by that institution.  
With mispriced guarantees and the repeal of Glass-Steagall, the only protection the financial 
system had from excessive risk  taking was prudential bank regulation, primarily through 
capital requirements aimed at constraining financial leverage and risk. The market failure 
here was that regulation should have been focused on such externalities so as to curb the 
risks to the financial sector and the economy at large.  However, prudential regulation of the 
financial sector has focused not on systemic risk but rather on the individual institution’s risk 
profile. This design is seriously flawed.  Regulation that ignores externalities encourages 
financial institutions to pass their risks in an unfettered manner throughout the system and 
on to unregulated entities.  
For instance, as they reduce their individual risks, financial institutions are rewarded with a 
lower capital requirement that gives them the license to originate more risk, possibly 
aggregate in nature. This new risk gets passed around in the system and creates a financial 
sector in which any individual institution’s risk of failure appears low to the regulator, but it is 
either hidden in the unregulated sector or has combined to form an aggregate concern—in 
either case, it is systemic in nature. Instead of penalizing behavior that leads to excessive 
systemic risk, current financial regulation appears to be rewarding it.  
                                                 
20 See Passmore (2005); Lucas and McDonald (2006). 
21 See the congressional testimony of Edward Pinto (US House 2008). ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
16 
As we have emphasized, in this crisis, financial firms loaded up on assets with low volatility 
and high systemic risk (and therefore high expected returns). At the risk of repeating, the 
best example was many of the large financial intermediaries that ignored their own 
securitization business models by holding onto the nondiversifiable credit risk associated 
with the AAA tranches of securitized loan portfolios. Because little capital (typically 10 to 
20% of nominal credit exposure) was attached to these bets—that is, the transactions were 
highly leveraged—it can be shown that their economic properties were those of writing an 
extreme out-of-the-money put option on the aggregate market.
22
The failure to focus on systemic risk, as opposed to individual institution risk, extends 
beyond prudential bank regulation. Specifically, there are several types of systemic risk that 
can be generated from the failure of a financial institution, especially during a financial crisis. 
Past crises also provide a guide here. 
 It is well known that writing 
out-of-the-money put options produces large expected returns;  this is why financial 
institutions engaged in the trade. Large expected returns, however, go hand in hand with 
large aggregate risk. There is no free lunch. This is why financial institutions got into so 
much trouble when the negative aggregate shock to the real estate market began in 2007. 
Consequently, the financial sector’s capital buffer to protect underperforming loans in times 
of recession eroded almost instantaneously, leaving the sector with no capital protection for 
very weak portfolios. 
The first is counterparty risk. If a financial institution is highly interconnected to many other 
financial institutions, then its failure can have a ripple effect throughout the system. Consider 
the  OTC  derivatives market. The main reason for systemic risk in OTC markets is that 
bilaterally set collateral and margin requirements in OTC trading do not take account of the 
“counterparty risk externality” that each trade imposes on the rest of the system, thus 
allowing systemically important exposures to be built up without sufficient capital to mitigate 
associated risks.
23
Another example was the rating downgrade of monoline insurers that took place in the first 
six months of 2008. As the major rating agencies began to downgrade the monoline insurers 
during 2008, their guarantees lost their AAA backing, and thousands of municipal bonds and 
structured products were downgraded as a consequence. The downgrades, in turn, caused 
financial institutions to increase capital requirements as the losses on the insured securities 
were forced back onto their balance sheets. Furthermore, institutions had to rebalance 
portfolios now that some of their underlying bonds were no longer AAA  rated, putting 
additional downward pressure on bond pricing. 
 The prime example in the current crisis is AIG, which built up US$450 
billion of one-sided credit default swap exposure on the so-called AAA  tranches of 
securitized products. These positions were created with little or no capital support. Because 
all the trades were in the same direction, once the trades lost value, it meant that AIG’s 
failure would inevitably propagate and amplify throughout the financial system.  
And, consider again the GSEs. As one of the largest investors in capital markets, the GSEs 
presented considerable counterparty risk to the system, similar in spirit to LTCM in the 
summer of 1998, as well as to the investment banks and some insurance companies during 
this current crisis. While often criticized for not adequately hedging the interest rate exposure 
of their portfolio, the GSEs were nevertheless major participants in the interest rate swaps 
market. As was characteristic of other LCFIs, the GSEs increased their swaps and 
derivatives positions through the years; by 2007 the total notional amount of their swaps and 
OTC derivatives was US$1.38 trillion and US$523 billion, respectively.
24
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 Failure of GSEs 
would have led to a winding  down of large quantities of swaps with the usual systemic 
consequences.  
23 See Acharya and Bisin (2009), who formalize the notion of counterparty risk externality. 
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The list could go on. But whether it was a few punters speculating in the curbside market 
outside the New York Stock Exchange in October 1907 who happened also to be exposed 
to many banks, or the 1984 collapse of Continental Illinois with exposure to over 2,000 other 
banks, or a failing LTCM in August 1998 with more than US$1.25 trillion in notional swap 
positions—making it the seventh-largest institution in notional derivatives—the warning signs 
should have been clear. The system cannot withstand the failure of a highly interconnected 
institution. In the oft-cited words of Mark Twain, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does 
rhyme.” 
The foregoing discussion also points to the second way systemic risk can enter the market, 
namely, spillover risk that arises as one institution’s trouble triggers liquidity spirals, leading 
to depressed asset prices and a hostile funding environment, pulling others down and thus 
leading to further price drops and funding illiquidity.
25
The third type of systemic risk is that financial institutions operating in the shadow banking 
system are subject to bank-like runs. The “new model” of banking relied heavily on the short-
term wholesale funding market. For example, the volume of repo transactions soared from 
US$2 trillion a day in 1997 to US$6 trillion daily a decade later in 2007, and money market 
funds accumulated over US$4 trillion in assets, compared with the US$8 trillion of deposits 
in the banking sector. Since these funds were rolled over on a short-term basis, sudden fund 
withdrawals that occur because of uncertainty about a financial institution’s health can 
ironically cause the institution to fail. Short-term liabilities were funding longer-term,  less 
liquid assets that the institutions could not unload in an orderly way. These are the same 
issues that exist in “old-fashioned” banking and are handled inside the bank using 
conventional asset and liability management—except here, the problem exists across 
institutional boundaries, and there is no asset-liability management process that transcends 
them. 
 In a distressed market, you sell what 
you can sell as long as liquidity remains, regardless of the underlying asset quality. In the 
case of the GSEs, which owned such a large (and leveraged) portfolio of relatively illiquid 
MBSs, their failure would have led to a fire sale of these assets that would have infected the 
rest of the financial system, which was holding similar assets. To the extent that the MBS 
market is one of the world’s largest debt markets, the fire sale could have brought other 
financial institutions down, similar to what actually happened with the subprime collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs). 
When a particular institution that is engaged in maturity mismatch fails in this manner, 
uncertainty about the health of similar institutions can lead to an indiscriminate run, and 
otherwise well-capitalized firms can face withdrawals of their short-term liabilities, in turn 
causing a systemic crisis. While many observers point to the fall of Lehman Brothers, the 
forced sale of Merrill Lynch, and near failure of Morgan Stanley—and possibly Goldman 
Sachs—as the most telling illustration of runs in this crisis, there are others. Most notably, 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the value of its short-term debt caused the largest 
money market fund, the Prime Reserve Fund, to “break the buck,” leading to a run on the 
entire system. Only the government’s 100% backstop of money market funds reversed the 
slide.  
More generally, consider the fact that securitization had become a primary tool to issue 
credit to individuals and corporations. The recent study by Acharya and others (2010, figure 
3.4) demonstrates the massive growth in this market from 2001 to 2007. Of course, if the 
securities underlying the pool of loans via securitization were held in the capital market at 
large, then there would not be a systemic issue. But as we know from this crisis, many of 
these securities were in fact held in vehicles that had recourse back to the sponsoring 
financial sector firms, funded using short-term, highly mobile, asset-backed commercial 
paper. This funding exposed the financial institutions to runs reminiscent of those seen 
during the Great Depression.  
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Two of the more  recent crises discussed earlier—the failure of Continental Illinois and 
LTCM—should have alerted the system and its regulators to the dangers of a new type of 
“bank run” (via the wholesale funding markets) and to the systemic nature of counterparty 
risk. These two types of failures were at the center of the current crisis. 
3.3  Opacity of Financial Institutions and Markets 
One can reasonably debate about the advantages and disadvantages of a more transparent 
financial system. On the one hand, transparency reduces the benefit of private information, 
which, in turn, reduces the collection of such information. On the other hand, the past 
crises—especially the Panic of 1907, the Great Depression, and the LTCM crisis—illustrate 
how information asymmetry can potentially lead to runs on the entire system, even if many 
of its institutions are healthy.  
There  are four types of institutions with different regulation and guarantee levels—
commercial banks, broker-dealers (investment banks), asset management firms, and 
insurance companies—and mispriced guarantees and excessive risk taking for any one type 
can wreak havoc on the whole financial sector. This is because of the counterparty risk 
externality  that has been largely unregulated. There are several aspects that have 
contributed to this externality. 
First, the incentive to get too big to fail pushes institutions towards the LCFI model, the 
regulatory structure for which has yet to be fully articulated. The coarseness and lack of 
regulatory granularity of these institutions has allowed the unregulated sectors—primarily, 
the so-called shadow banking sector and hedge funds—to thrive. Financial institutions have 
innovated ways to take unregulated risk exposure (for example, through prime brokerage 
activity) and to park their assets off the balance sheet temporarily (for example, in the form 
of asset-backed conduits and structured investment vehicles)  so as to get relief from 
regulatory capital requirements  and subsequently take on additional risks. The sheer 
magnitude of this activity —especially in the shadow banking sector— and its recourse to 
the financial sector have meant that systemically important pockets can easily develop in the 
financial system that have little or no regulatory oversight or scrutiny.  
With the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the lack of market discipline due to government 
guarantees, the financial system’s only protection was through the regulators (that is, 
regulatory capital requirements).  However, there was no one single regulatory body 
responsible for LCFIs. This allowed for substantial regulatory arbitrage across regulators. 
The most telling example was that AIG was able to choose the OTS as the regulatory body 
for its holding company because it had bought a small savings and loan. The OTS clearly 
did not have the expertise to supervise the insurer’s parent company. Indeed, it can be 
argued that lapses in LCFI corporate governance, laid bare during the crisis, suggest that 
such institutions may be too big and complex to manage and control, not to mention too big 
and complex for just about any external regulator to do its job effectively.  
Second, innovations for sharing risk such as credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized 
debt and loan obligations (CDOs and CLOs, respectively), which have the potential to serve 
a fundamental risk-sharing and information role in the economy, were designed to trade in 
opaque, OTC markets. While such a trading infrastructure is generally beneficial to large 
players and has some benefits in terms of matching trading counterparties, its opacity—
especially in terms of counterparty exposures—is a serious shortcoming from the standpoint 
of financial stability during a systemic crisis. If financial institutions take on large exposures 
in such markets (for example, commercial banks with access to mispriced deposit insurance 
encouraging the growth of a large insurer providing credit protection), then the failure of a 
single large institution can raise concerns about the solvency of all others, given the opacity 
of institutional linkages. ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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The main problem associated with the trading of OTC derivatives (CDSs, foreign exchange 
derivatives, and interest rate swaps, among others) is that the contracts are bilateral, 
typically with collateral depending on the type of contracts and the rating of the counterparty. 
The advantage of OTC contracts is that they are tailor made, which is important to entities 
that want to be perfectly hedged. On the other hand, they are more subject to liquidity 
shocks and counterparty risk. Moreover, an issue that transcends these two problems is the 
lack of transparency within the system. Unlike in the case of a central clearing house or an 
exchange, no one knows precisely what the total exposure is, where it is concentrated, and 
what the value of such contracts is. These issues always exist, but they rarely surface when 
positions are small. However, when the sizes become large, and combined commitments 
are many times larger than the underlying contracts, the lack of transparency makes the 
system prone to information problems, converting a small shock into a systemic failure.  
In the current crisis, counterparty risk concerns arose around the failures of Bear Stearns 
(which was a large CDS clearer), Lehman Brothers (on which CDSs  were traded in 
significant quantity), and AIG (which had written US$450 billion worth of CDSs on AAA-rated 
CDO tranches of mortgages, loans, and bonds). Table 2-3 illustrates the magnitude of the 
OTC derivatives problem in this crisis relating to AIG, showing the payments (via 
government aid) to its various counterparties in the autumn of 2008. The payments are 
broken down into collateral postings under CDS contracts, outright purchase and closing of 
contracts tied to CDSs on nonprime mortgage-backed securities via Maiden Lane III, and 
guaranteed investment agreements held by municipalities. The table shows that almost 
US$60 billion of losses would have been borne by counterparties, causing possible failures 
elsewhere in the system and potentially leading to a meltdown. 
Table 3: AIG Financial Products Counterparty Payments,  
September 16, 2008 to December 31, 2008 in Billions of dollars 
Collateral postings under AIGFP 
CDS 
Maiden Lane III payments to AIGFP 
CDS counterparties 
Payments under guaranteed 
investment agreements 
Société Générale: 4.1  Société Générale: 6.9  California: 1.02 
Deutsche Bank: 2.6  Goldman Sachs: 5.6  Virginia: 1.01 
Goldman Sachs: 2.5  Merrill Lynch: 3.1  Hawaii: 0.77 
Merrill Lynch: 1.8  Deutsche Bank: 2.8  Ohio: 0.49 
Calyon: 1.1  UBS: 2.5  Georgia: 0.41 
Barclays: 0.9  Calyon: 1.2  Colorado: 0.36 





Bank of Montreal: 0.9  Massachusetts: 0.34 
Wachovia: 0.7  Wachovia: 0.8  Kentucky: 0.29 
Rabobank: 0.5  Barclays: 0.6  Oregon: 0.27 
Total for top twenty  
counterparties: 18.3 
. . .  Total for top twenty 
counterparties: 7 
Overall total: 22.4  Overall total: 27.1  Overall total: 12.10 
Source: AIG (www.aig.com/aigweb/internet/en/files/CounterpartyAttachments031809_tcm385-155645.pdf).  
An equally important issue is that there was essentially no regulatory oversight  or 
jurisdiction. Currently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,  SEC,  and the Fed 
regulate exchange-traded derivatives in a fragmented manner, resulting in inefficiencies and 
arguably a waste of valuable resources. In contrast, OTC derivatives are mostly 
unregulated, creating a clear incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage. This lack of ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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regulation of OTC derivatives received a seal of approval by the passage of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, under heavy lobbying pressure from the financial 
industry. In fact, a number of policymakers have argued that this act  led to serious 
deficiencies in the system, including Enron taking advantage of this legislation in some of its 
fraudulent accounting practices, and perhaps more important, the unchecked growth of the 
CDS market. 
In short, growth in the size of financial institutions and in their linkages and fragility has 
raised the prospect of extreme counterparty risk  concerns. When these concerns have 
materialized, financial institutions have been unable to fathom how losses resulting from a 
large institution’s failure would travel along the complex chains connecting them. The 
consequence has been complete illiquidity of securities (such as credit derivatives)  held 
primarily by these institutions and a paralysis of interbank markets, which, in turn, has 
paralyzed credit intermediation in the whole economy. It is important to realize that what 
superficially may appear to be a problem of illiquidity of a class of assets and markets may 
well be a symptom of the deeper issues of excessive leverage, risk taking, and the resulting 
insolvency of financial institutions fueled at least partly by mispriced guarantees.  
Financial institutions, left to private incentives, do not and will not internalize this potentially 
severe counterparty risk externality.  
3.4  Runs on the System 
As discussed in the systemic risk section of this chapter, regulated financial institutions, as 
well as their unregulated siblings, have fragile capital structures in that they hold assets with 
long duration or low liquidity, but their liabilities are mainly short term in nature. While 
commercial banks are not subject to large-scale runs because of deposit insurance and 
central bank lender of last resort support, the other kinds of institutions are vulnerable, and 
indeed many of them—most notably Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, as well as a 
number of managed funds in the money market and hedge fund arena—did experience 
“wholesale” runs during the crisis. And commercial banks still are subject to localized runs in 
the wholesale funding and interbank markets if they themselves are perceived to have 
exposure to institutions experiencing large-scale runs.  
Of course, not all runs are problems that need a regulatory fix. In the crisis of , it is not clear 
that the run on subprime lenders in the first half of 2007, the run on asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits in the second half of 2007, and the run on hedge funds post-
Lehman were market failures. Take the asset-backed commercial paper market as an 
example. There is much discussion in academic and policy circles about the sudden inability 
of asset-backed commercial paper conduits to roll over their commercial paper. Some view 
this as a run on the system that needed to be fixed—a “buyer’s strike.” But this was not 
because of information asymmetry about the quality of the underlying asset-backed 
securities. Rather, there was a sudden awareness that the risk of all the AA- and AAA-rated 
tranches of the underlying asset-backed securities  was systemic in nature, and that  the 
likelihood of this risk had increased sufficiently so that these securities were no longer safe 
for investment portfolios. In other words, this was not a question of insolvency. If insolvency 
is defined as trading below par, then all these conduits were insolvent, given the fact that 
they lacked any meaningful capital support. 
Thus the real concern is when runs are not affiliated with failure or insolvency. For example, 
during the early 1930s, the banking crisis led to runs on many solvent institutions, and 
likewise, during the week of Lehman’s failure, the crisis led to runs on money market funds 
that had not “broken the buck.”  To the extent that such runs represent an information 
contagion from runs on other, less deserving institutions, they carry a systemic externality. In 
other words, addressing the likelihood of runs on the shadow banking sector—the uninsured 
parts of the intermediation sector—may be a critical ingredient to stabilizing the system as a 
whole. ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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4.  PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
What implication does the financial crisis—and our assessment of market failures that led to 
it—have for financial regulation going forward? 
The previous section outlined four market failures that are interlinked and need to be 
addressed collectively:  
—mispriced government guarantees, 
—focus on individual versus systemic risk of firms, 
—lack of transparency in the financial system, and  
—runs on the financial system.  
We now consider appropriate regulation to deal with these failures. 
4.1  Risk-Taking Incentives and Systemic Risk of Financial 
Institutions 
With respect to the risk-taking incentives of financial firms, much of the focus by 
policymakers in the US and elsewhere has been on both the type and level of compensation 
contracts within financial firms. It has been argued that, in the period leading up to the crisis, 
bankers were increasingly paid through short-term cash bonuses based on volume and 
current marked-to-market profits, rather than on the long-term profitability contribution of 
their bets. Coupled with the fact that shareholders of the failed (or nearly failed) institutions 
lost most of their investments, policymakers see this as prima facie evidence of massive 
failure of corporate governance at the equity level (that is, between shareholders and 
boards, and between boards and managers). That Citigroup’s board fired its CEO in 2008 
without a succession plan would be astounding in any listed company whose shareholders 
are about to be devastated, much less a systemically critical financial conglomerate. While 
clearly this view cannot be completely discounted, we believe that, in the end, it is not the 
issue of greatest urgency or an issue where it is clear what advantage regulators have in 
resolving it. As outlined in the preceding section, the costliest market failure of corporate 
governance—one that regulators can do something about with reasonable precision and 
success—was at the debt and regulatory levels. 
To understand this, we examine how the claim structure of the LCFIs is different from that of 
a regular nonfinancial firm. On the liability side, LCFIs are highly levered entities. At least 
90%  of the claim holders of an LCFI are debt holders (including depositors). Another 
claimant is the government as guarantor. Given this structure of claims, corporate 
governance mechanisms that align the manager with equity holders may deviate 
significantly from those that maximize firm value. Put differently, corporate governance 
mechanisms in LCFIs have to be designed so as to align the manager with the interests of 
the debt holders and the government guarantor and not just those of the shareholders.  
To assess the role of regulation in this context, it is useful to think through the optimal 
governance system that the LCFI should have. Take the example of FDIC insurance.
26
                                                 
26 Note that the same reasoning holds for other types of insurance provided by the government, for instance, the 
implicit insurance provided to TBTF institutions. 
 If the 
FDIC insurance is properly priced, the with-guarantee value of the LCFI would be equal to 
the without-guarantee value of the LCFI. On the other hand, if the FDIC insurance is not 
properly priced, then the appropriate objective in structuring corporate governance and 
managerial incentives would be to maximize the without-guarantee value of the LCFI. 
Otherwise, the LCFI management might make value-destroying choices to take advantage 
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If one were to specify a model of a banking system with limited liability in which each bank 
both maximizes shareholder value under conditions in which the regulator provides a safety 
net (that is, guarantees for creditors such as deposit insurance or implicit TBTF support) and 
also faces systemic risk (that is, systemwide costs in a crisis), the optimal plan would be for 
the regulator to “tax” (that is, charge an insurance premium) each individual bank an amount 
equal to the sum of two components.
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The first component would be the bank’s  expected losses upon default.  That is, the 
government guarantees in the system need to be priced. Financial firms must pay for the 
guarantees they receive. Because the price of these guarantees will vary across firms in 
light of their different risk profiles, each firm will choose some optimal level of risk-taking 
activities consistent with the cost of the guarantees, almost surely at a more prudent level 
than in the absence of appropriately priced insurance. Ostensibly, the FDIC determines the 
level of premiums it charges on the basis of risk, although in reality, premiums are only 
charged when the  fund is poorly capitalized. Consequently, this policy will not optimally 
evaluate the firm’s assets, and the result will be excessive risk shifting. Hence insurance 
premiums need to be charged to banks on a risk-sensitive basis, and crucially, at all parts of 
the cycle. Premiums should not be rebated to banks in good times, as this destroys the 
incentive role played by premiums. 
 
The second component would be the bank’s contribution to a systemic crisis, that is, its 
marginal expected losses in the crisis, or in other words, the contribution of each firm to 
aggregate losses above a certain threshold of aggregate losses. In addition to expected 
losses, the systemic risk contribution also needs to be priced. In this way, the financial 
institutions can be made to internalize the costs of the negative externality imposed on the 
system by their losses and failures. Arguably, the principal failure that contributed to the  
crisis was that financial sector regulations sought to limit each institution’s risk in isolation 
and did not focus sufficiently on systemic risk. As a result, while individual firms’ risks might 
have been properly dealt with in normal times, the system itself remained, or was induced to 
be, fragile  and vulnerable to large macroeconomic shocks. Consistent with economic 
intuition, these systemic losses increased with lower initial capital, riskier asset holdings that 
contributed to the tail interdependence between the institution and the system, institutional 
and aggregate volatility, and the severity of the externality.  
Charging a premium for systemic risk will cause financial institutions on the margin to hold 
more initial capital up front (be less leveraged) and to take less risky positions. That is, by 
incorporating the “tax” in exposure decisions, the financial institution will organically choose 
to become less systemic. Putting aside the political economy of the viability of expanding 
FDIC-like premiums, the biggest hurdle to successful implementation is measuring systemic 
risk contributions and setting the proper price for the insurance. There are two main 
obstacles. 
First, the regulator may not have the expertise to set the appropriate price. This is especially 
true with LCFIs, since their risk profile can change rapidly as they enter and exit markets or 
change the weight of various kinds of exposures. There are a number of empirical studies 
that use publicly available data and standard statistical techniques to evaluate whether the 
more systemic firms do, in fact, perform worse in crisis conditions, and the findings seem 
quite encouraging that systemic risk is generally measurable.
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An alternative solution to this first problem would be to partially privatize the systemic 
guarantees through private reinsurance or a public-private reinsurance scheme.
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27 For a formal treatment of such a “tax,” see Acharya and others (2009); Acharya and Yorulmazer (2009). 
 The idea 
is that private insurers would help price the insurance while the government would provide 
most of the underlying capital in return for a proportionate share of the premium income. 
28 See, for example, Acharya and others (2009). 
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While some  reinsurance schemes have been considered by the FDIC, most recently in 
1993, with the conclusion that the market did not seem viable, there is reason to be more 
optimistic today. Financial markets in general have become much more sophisticated in how 
they develop niche products. An example of innovative coinsurance, motivated by the events 
of September 11, 2001, is the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, enacted in November 2002 and 
providing federal reinsurance for qualifying losses from a terrorist attack. The Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act incorporates both industry loss triggers and government excess loss 
coverage, which helps to minimize the insurance industry’s losses yet provides insurers with 
an incentive to price, monitor, and reduce risks. Something similar might work in this context. 
The second problem in charging for systemic risk contributions is perhaps more serious. The 
issue with moral hazard is that ex ante contracting does not lead to first-best actions.
30
—The creation of an insolvency regime  for complex financial institutions that 
would allow the orderly failure or restructuring of insolvent firms. Under current 
discussion are plans to force firms to develop an ex ante way for them to unwind 
if they fail—a “living will.” Putting aside whether  this is feasible for global 
institutions, this type of punishment would pass the moral hazard test. 
 . 
Because the actions of banks are not fully observable after the premiums for the guarantees 
and systemic risk are set, the banks can subsequently change their behavior. While a 
private market such as that just described may be better able to monitor bank actions, the 
optimal contract in such a setting usually calls for some type of state-contingent mechanism. 
It often imposes a severe penalty function in bad states to get the agent (that is, the bank) to 
avoid excessive risk-taking activities. It involves the same underlying economics as do most 
insurance contracts to the extent that those contracts often have large deductibles. Here, the 
“punishment” can take several forms, all with the intention of aligning incentives and thus 
bringing back market discipline: 
—Alternatively, one could require financial institutions to hold in their capital 
structure a new kind of “hybrid” claim that has a forced debt-for-equity conversion 
whenever a prespecified threshold of distress (individual, systemic, or both) is 
breached.
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—A less discussed option is to institute so-called double liability for stockholders 
of financial institutions.
 While this has the benefit of recapitalizing financial firms in a crisis, 
more significantly, it brings back market discipline via creditor losses.  
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Arguably less efficient, but easier to implement, would be a state-contingent plan for deposit 
insurance premiums that are higher in good states and thus reduce the net payoff in these 
states. Reducing these payoffs provides less reward to excess risk-taking activities as well. 
This reduction would effectively take the form of windfall profit taxes.
 Under double liability, shareholders of the bank lose not 
only the value of the stock but are also charged an additional penalty, possibly up 
to the par value of their holdings. While double liability may be impractical and 
raises many conceptual and legal issues, it was in fact standard practice from 
1863 to 1933. 
33 A related idea is to 
require that firms have a certain amount of convertible debt that dilutes shareholders’ 
percentage ownership during good economic times, reducing the return to undertaking risky 
gambles.
34
The success of the Banking Act of 1933 had two sides to it. On the one hand, it effectively 
put an end to runs on bank deposits. On the other hand, it managed the moral hazard 
 
                                                 
30 For example, John, John, and Senbet (1991); Prescott (2002). 
31 See, for example, Doherty and Harrington (1997); Flannery (2002); Squam Lake Working Group (2009); 
Hancock and Passmore (2009). 
32 Kane and Wilson (1997). 
33 For examples of payoff structures in a stylized model of deposit insurance, see Prescott (2002). 
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problem through a combination of insurance premiums, capital requirements, and separation 
of investment and commercial banking. Currently, however, the general view is that 
insurance premiums are lowered by banks through lobbying in good times, higher capital 
requirements are quite costly—not just privately for bankers but also for society—and 
separation of bank activities by scope is no longer feasible. We explain below that these 
concerns are either surmountable or overstated.  
Consider, for instance, the case of higher capital requirements, with capital defined as core 
equity. The Modigliani-Miller theorem, the most basic theorem in finance, shows that the 
value of the firm’s assets will be the same regardless of how those assets are financed when 
the form of financing does not distort  the nature of asset investments.
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Putting aside the tax benefits of debt, the issue of how costly it is to raise equity depends on 
whether one believes the agency problems of LCFIs are due primarily to conflicts between 
shareholders and managers, or to conflicts between shareholders and creditors  or 
regulators. If it is the latter, as we have argued, then the relatively higher cost of equity 
financing versus debt financing is being driven by the mispriced guarantees that benefit the 
creditors. Fixing this problem—that is, charging for the guarantees and systemic risk—is 
tantamount to charging for higher leverage, which will, in turn, put the cost of capital for debt 
and equity on equal footing. While it is true that banks can alter their risks in fairly swift and 
opaque fashions, and this necessitates a certain amount of demandable debt for discipline, 
this argument has yet to be tested for complete empirical merit when favorable tax treatment 
of debt and mispricing of debt due to government guarantees have been properly accounted 
for. 
 In other words, 
choosing investments should be based solely on whether the return on the project’s assets 
exceeds its cost of capital for those assets. Increasing the return on equity via leverage is 
just a wash and contributes nothing to efficiency in capital allocation. Given that the systemic 
costs to leverage are so high, this suggests that higher capital requirements will not 
necessarily be socially costly at all. While the Modigliani-Miller theorem is not reality, it is a 
useful starting point. 
Thus higher capital requirements for riskier—and systemically riskier—activities are certainly 
an option. However, as we have learned from the  financial crisis, capital requirements can 
be gamed. So, to some extent, the financial system must rely on the power and supervisory 
expertise of the regulator. Furthermore, significant improvements are possible by closing 
major capital loopholes and relying less heavily on the rating agencies. With respect to the 
loopholes, a good rule of thumb is that if off-balance-sheet financing in reality involves 
recourse back to the banks, then the capital at risk should be treated as though the activity 
were on the balance sheet. Moreover, counterparty credit risk exposures to financial firms, 
including OTC derivatives and securities financing transactions, should also be taken into 
account. 
While the Basel II Accord did expand the notion of risk for financial institutions, in hindsight, 
it chose simplicity over accuracy in the determination of how capital should be treated. It 
seems reasonable to consider not only the credit risk of defaultable assets but also the 
liquidity, funding, market, and specification (or valuation model) risks. In retrospect, Basel II 
was necessary but not sufficient for preventing institutional and systemic failure. It focuses 
narrowly on the individual risk of institutions but ignores altogether the systemic risk. Indeed, 
by encouraging the use of CDSs to reduce banks’ regulatory capital, it arguably encouraged 
the concentration of risk elsewhere (in monoline insurers and AIG, which turned out to be 
highly vulnerable) and propagated systemic risk. 
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4.1.1  Example: AAA-Rated Tranches of CDOs  
We can illustrate some of these ideas using the super senior AAA tranche of collateralized 
debt obligations relative to a more standard AAA-rated asset, say an AAA corporate bond. 
Specifically, assume that the probability and magnitude of losses (that is, the expected mean 
and variance) associated with default are similar between the two classes of securities. 
What are the differences? 
First, there is the liquidity risk, which refers to the ability of the holder to convert the security 
or asset into cash. Even before the crisis started, the super senior tranches were considered 
to be highly illiquid and more of a hold-to-maturity type of security. The fact that these 
securities offered a spread should not be surprising, given that there are numerous 
documentations of a price to illiquidity. For instance, consider the well-documented spread 
between the off-the-run and on-the-run US Treasuries.
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Second, there is the funding risk, which refers to the mismatch in the maturity of the assets 
and liabilities. There is a tendency for financial institutions to hold long-term assets using 
cheap short-term funding, a kind of a “carry trade.” But this exposes the institution to greater 
risk of a run if short-term funding evaporates during a crisis. Indeed, some researchers have 
argued for capital requirements to take into account this particular funding risk.
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Third, the systematic risk of the AAA tranche is much higher than that of the more standard 
AAA-rated asset. The AAA  tranche has no idiosyncratic risk, so all of its volatility 
surrounding the probability and losses associated with default occurs only when the market 
does poorly and households’ or corporations’ underlying assets in the CDOs default in a 
correlated fashion. In other words, the losses occur when the system can least afford them. 
This is particularly acute in systemic crises because these correlated defaults are most likely 
to occur during extreme market downturns. 
 These two 
points suggest that it would be useful to know the “liquid” assets the financial institution 
holds against short-term funding. One could imagine that the higher the ratio, the less an 
institution is subject to a liquidity shock and therefore the less risky it is. 
The fourth and  final  difference has to do with a form of risk rarely discussed, the one 
associated with specification error or model risk. It is important to realize that the 
measurement error of risk varies across assets—consider the difference between measuring 
the interest rate risk of Treasury securities versus the aggregate market risk of stocks. The 
AAA tranches, especially those involving more structured products like CDOs-squared, are 
mathematically equivalent to a compound option.
38
Capital requirements should be a function of the risk of the underlying assets, and these 
risks should be related to the above issues. To the extent that financial institutions spend 
considerable time and effort circumventing capital rules by searching for higher spreads and 
consequently engaging higher risks, appropriate accounting for these risks would help 
alleviate the excessive risk taking. 
 It is well known that compound options 
are very sensitive to the risk (volatility)—and the risk that risk will change (volatility of 
volatility)—of the underlying asset. For AAA-tranche CDOs, the initial parameters chosen 
are the correlation and volatility of the loans  in the portfolio. Given the fact that these 
parameters are mostly unknown and likely to evolve over time in any case, it suggests 
caution in estimating the risks and treating them as known in banks’ or regulators’ internal 
risk models. 
As a final comment on capital requirements, there is much discussion in policy circles about 
whether narrower banking, along the lines of the Glass-Steagall provisions of the 1933 
Banking Act, would help alleviate systemic risk. Narrow banking would generally restrict the 
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types of exposures that could be built up by institutions subject to deposit insurance and 
other forms of government support, such as proprietary and directional trading, equity 
investments using the firm’s capital and implicitly through asset management activities like 
mutual funds and hedge funds, and structured asset-backed securities intended to be 
passed onto the capital market at large (“pipeline or warehouse exposure”). There is some 
validity to this view, although it is often described as impractical in a world of global banking. 
Of course, if substantial capital requirements were tied to the riskier exposures, then LCFIs 
should, on their own, decide to engage in less of these risky activities, and functional 
separation of activity generating systemic risk could be achieved in an organic fashion rather 
than by fiat. 
4.2  Transparency 
All financial crises have the common feature that opacity greatly amplifies the financial 
shock, leading to bank-like runs and the freezing of markets. It is not clear how one could 
regulate LCFIs to become more transparent. Any “systemic risk” regulator that is established 
will undoubtedly try, most likely by requiring the LCFI to release financial information that 
takes into account off-balance-sheet financing, maturity mismatch, liquid asset holdings 
versus short-term funding, and so on. The hope is that regulation based on correctly pricing 
government guarantees, a systemic risk assessment, and mandatory convertible debt would 
organically lead to greater transparency. The LCFIs would have incentives to let the market 
know it is much less complex and risky than meets the eye. 
In 2007–2009 crisis, the leading candidate for the bottleneck in the financial system was the 
OTC market for derivatives. Its sheer size and unregulated nature meant that there literally 
was no information about counterparty exposures, either at the regulatory or market level. 
Fixing this key problem, perhaps after the LTCM debacle, would have gone a long way 
toward making the most recent crisis less severe. 
Regulators should separate the economic role played by derivatives and financial 
transactions from shortcomings in their trading infrastructure. There is little merit in shutting 
down these markets (for example, prohibiting short selling), even during crises. However, 
the  concerns arising in the case of counterparty risk due to the opaque nature of OTC 
derivatives need to be addressed:  
—First, standardized markets,  such as credit default swaps  and related 
indexes, should be traded on centralized counterparty-cum-clearinghouses or 
exchanges:  
—Second, smaller, less standardized markets, such as for collateralized debt 
and loan obligations,  which also pose significant counterparty risk issues, 
should have at the least a centralized clearing mechanism so that a clearing 
registry is available to regulators to assess the contagion effects of a large 
institution’s failure.  
—Third, OTC markets can continue to remain the platform through which 
financial products are innovated; but to give these markets an incentive to 
move to a centralized registry and eventually to a clearing  house, there 
should be an explicit regulator in charge of enforcing higher transparency in 
OTC markets—possibly in the form of bilateral information on net exposures 
with some time delay—and providing infrastructure for enforcement relating 
to insider trading and market manipulation practices; 
—Fourth,  in order to implement these changes, the regulator may simply 
have to play the coordinating role —possibly requiring some firmness with 
large players—to move trading onto centralized trading platforms. Also, the 
global nature of these markets will require a certain degree of international 
coordination between regulators, especially when timely counterparty 
information is required.  ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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Table 4 summarizes some of the market mechanisms and characteristics associated with 
possible trading of OTC derivatives. 
Table 4: Summary of Different OTC Market Organization 
 
Source: Acharya and Richardson (2009b). 
Bank Runs in the Shadow Banking System 
The Panic of 1907 and the banking crises of 1930, 1931, and 1933 all had in common 
massive systemwide runs on banks. Arguably, the most recent crisis also went pandemic 
when  there was a run on the investment banks and money market funds after Lehman 
Brothers failed. But the earlier Bear Stearns episode also had the features of a run, even 
Market organization 
  OTC  Registry  Clearing house  Exchange 






















































































Transparent to all 
Current levels of 
volume and open 
interest 
information 
Opaque  Largely opaque  More transparent  Transparent to all 




Opaque  Available only to 
regulators 
Available only to 
regulators 
Available only to 
regulators 
Netting of cash 
flows 




Bilateral only  Bilateral only  Yes  Yes 








Yes  Yes ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
28 
though the firm was neither particularly large nor particularly complex. Like past runs, the 
runs on investment banks and money market funds occurred because there was uncertainty 
and lack of information about the health of these institutions, and their funding sources were 
short term and highly mobile (repo and securities lending transactions for investment banks, 
and short-term fund flows for money market funds).  
As mentioned repeatedly in this chapter, the solution in the 1930s was to create deposit 
insurance and a number of protections to counter risk-taking activities. In the most recent 
crisis, the government temporarily guaranteed money market funds and, some would argue, 
the creditors of investment banks when it offered support to Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley after experiencing the systemic impact of Lehman’s failure in the fall of 2008. The 
ongoing question is, what should financial regulation to contain the risk of contagious runs in 
the shadow banking world look like? There seem to be two ways to go. 
One  surefire approach to prevent runs would be to guarantee the liabilities. But these 
guarantees would need to be priced, and surely the activities of these firms would need to 
be restrained in a Glass-Steagall manner. This regulatory approach advocated above—
insurance plus scope restrictions—also calls for pricing the guarantees and systemic risk. 
Existing research, both ours and that of others, suggests that systemic risk (estimated from 
market data) is higher for firms that have a mismatch between their assets and liabilities. 
Thus a systemic premium for a guarantee would be one way  to proceed. Financial 
institutions would have an incentive to lower the assessment through reducing the mismatch 
in funding. This reduction in funding would naturally lower the probability of a systemwide 
run. 
A more structured approach would be to impose  liquidity requirements on financial 
institutions that are similar in spirit to the way capital requirements are imposed. The basic 
idea would be to mandate that a proportion of the short-term funding must be in liquid 
assets—ones that can be sold immediately and in quantity at current prices. This 
requirement might also be sufficient to prevent runs. It will, in effect, increase the cost to 
financial institutions of taking on carry trades and holding long-term asset-backed securities. 
For example, in the context of the securitization market, the business model was developed 
under the premise of “originate to distribute.” But in this crisis, financial firms did not follow 
this model. Instead, firms held onto these securities and funded these purchases short term, 
creating a significant mismatch and making them susceptible to runs. Imposition of liquidity 
requirements would cause these trading activities to migrate naturally to the capital market 
at large (for example, pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, and trading accounts of 
wealthy individuals), where they arguably belong. 
Highly regulated entities such as money market funds would be treated similarly, albeit with 
less reliance on the credit rating agencies. And, in accordance with our earlier arguments, 
regulators would need to consider not only the credit risk of defaultable assets but also their 
liquidity, market, and specification or model risks. 
The implementation of liquidity requirements to stem runs is complicated by the fact that 
some institutions benefit from a government guarantee of their short-term funding (such as 
deposit insurance) while other firms do not. The purpose of the guarantee (at least in the 
case of deposit insurance) is  so  that banks can provide loans to the real sector of the 
economy without the threat of a run, not so that they can  load up on illiquid, long-term 
securities. Of course, if the guarantees are mispriced, then banks with insured deposits will 
have an incentive to enter the market of managed funds and money market funds, and this 
regulatory arbitrage might distort prices and risks. ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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5.  LESSONS FOR EMERGING MARKETS 
We conclude by discussing the implications of the financial crisis—and of our assessment of 
the market and regulatory failures that led to it—for financial stability in emerging markets. 
We focus on three issues: government guarantees, mostly in the form of deposit insurance; 
the implications of these guarantees in the current crisis; and the transmission of systemic 
risk. 
5.1  Government Guarantees 
Explicit and implicit government guarantees such as deposit insurance and implicit TBTF 
status can generate significant moral hazard in the form of risk-taking incentives. Even 
absent other market failures, this moral hazard can lead to excessive systemic risk and 
financial fragility. Consider our analysis of the lessons for the US from the current crisis. 
Deposit insurance enacted in the 1930s in the wake of the Great Depression had long-term 
success only because significant protections were put in place in terms of insurance 
charges, regulation (mostly in the form of capital requirements and wind-down provisions), 
and restrictions on bank activity. As these protections began to erode in the US in recent 
years, the moral hazard problem resurfaced. 
To some degree, this lesson was already known to researchers studying the moral hazard of 
government guarantees in emerging markets. As pointed out by Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 
(2002), the number of countries offering explicit deposit insurance increased multifold from 
twelve to seventy-one in the thirty-year period starting in the 1970s. They argue that the key 
feature of a successful deposit insurance scheme is the financial and regulatory environment 
in which it functions. Such environmental conditions include the coverage limits of deposit 
insurance, the degree to which depositors take coinsurance on their balances, restrictions 
on certain deposit accounts, and whether the program is funded publicly or privately, among 
other characteristics. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) look at a large cross-section of countries in the post-
1980 period and conclude that deposit insurance increases the likelihood of a banking 
crisis.
39
In addition, the analysis in the first and second sections argues that opacity amplifies the 
financial crisis once it starts and suggests remedies for this problem. Consistent with this 
view, Kaufmann and Mehrez (2000) find that for a large cross-section of countries, a lack of 
transparency worsens financial crises. The authors conclude that regulation should focus on 
increasing  the  transparency  of economic activity, government policy,  and the financial 
sector, especially when the country is going through a period of financial liberalization.
 Moreover, the likelihood and severity of the crisis increase  the  weaker  the 
institutional and regulatory environments  are  and the greater the coverage offered to 
depositors. The authors conclude that the incentive problems associated with the moral 
hazard from deposit insurance can be partially offset by effective prudential regulation and 
loss  control features of deposit insurance. This result is completely consistent with the 
analysis provided here in relation to the US. 
40
5.2  Bailouts, the Current Crisis, and Emerging Markets 
  
The provision of government guarantees is quite common during a crisis, and has occurred, 
for example, in Sweden (1992), Japan (1996), Thailand (1997), Republic of Korea (1997), 
Malaysia (1998), and Indonesia (1998).
41
                                                 
39. See also Hovakimiam, Kane, and Laeven (2003). 
 In the current crisis, the US guaranteed money 
40. This, too, is the conclusion of Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002). 
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market funds after the fall of Lehman Brothers and made explicit the previously  implicit 
guarantees of the GSEs and the TBTF institutions. 
What is the impact of such guarantees? 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) find that unlimited depositor guarantees and regulatory 
forbearance increase the fiscal costs of financial crises.
42
Of course, many analysts might point to the apparent “success” of the guarantees employed 
in the US during the current financial crisis, and even more so to the stellar success stories 
of  the  Indian  and Chinese banking sectors  and the government backing they received. 
Therefore we analyze these latter cases as examples in emerging markets. 
 Moreover, these actions increase 
the expectation that this will be the government’s solution for future crises, thus undercutting 
market discipline and increasing the chances of risk-shifting among financial institutions. 
Laeven (2002) also finds that in many countries, deposit insurance is sharply underpriced, 
thus contributing to both the likelihood of a financial crisis and the cost of one if it occurs. Of 
course, as described in the second section, deposit insurance premiums were not collected 
from most banks in the US from 1996 to 2005 because their funds were considered to be 
well capitalized. As in the discussion of government guarantees above, the lesson here is 
that the problems that plagued the US  are similar to those that have afflicted emerging 
markets. 
Consider India first. A significant part of the Indian banking system is still state owned. While 
they are generally considered less efficient and sophisticated than the private sector banks, 
public sector banks in India actually grew in importance during the financial crisis (which for 
India could be considered as the year 2008). The reason is simple and somewhat perverse: 
there was a “flight to safety” away from private sector banks, which have limited deposit 
insurance, to public sector banks, which are 100% government guaranteed (effectively so, 
as with the GSEs in the US). This is because the relevant law (the Bank Nationalization Act) 
explicitly places 100% liability for public sector banks on the government.  
Hence, when the financial crisis hit India—especially in autumn of 2008, by which time the 
Indian stock market had plummeted by more than 50%  and corporate withdrawals from 
money market funds threatened a chain of liquidations from the financial sector—there was 
a flight of deposits to state-owned banks.
43 During the period from January 1, 2008, through 
February 24, 2009, the public sector banks’ market capitalization fell by 20% less than that 
of the private sector banks. Interestingly, this occurred even though based on a precrisis 
measure of systemic risk—the marginal expected shortfall measure—public sector banks 
were substantially more likely to lose market capitalization during a marketwide downturn 
than private sector banks.
44
The trend of benefiting  the state-owned banking sector at the expense of the privately 
owned banking sector continues. Recent reports suggest that loan growth among private 
sector banks in India has not been that high in 2009, whereas loans at public sector banks 
 In addition, within the private sector banks, those with higher 
systemic risk suffered more during the economy-wide crisis of 2008 (as the systemic risk 
measure would predict), whereas within public sector banks, those with higher systemic risk 
actually performed better! This divergence in the behavior of public and private sector banks 
is telling and strongly suggests a role for government guarantees in boosting weak public 
sector banks at the expense of similar-risk private sector banks. 
                                                 
42.For further analysis and discussion of the costs of providing guarantees during a banking crisis, see also 
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43 In a notable incident, Infosys, the bellwether of Indian technology and a NASDAQ-listed company, moved its 
cash in hand from ICICI Bank, one of the largest private sector banks, to State Bank of India, the largest public 
sector bank. 
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have grown in many segments, such as vehicle-backed finance, by as much as 10 percent. 
In essence, government guarantees have created an uneven playing field, which is 
destabilizing for two reasons. First, it has weakened those institutions that are in fact subject 
to market discipline. Second, it has raised prospects that the “handicapped” private sector 
banks (due to lack of comparable government guarantees) may have to lend—or take other 
risks—more aggressively in  order to maintain market share and generate comparable 
returns to shareholders. Bank regulation in India tends to be on the conservative side, often 
reining in risk taking with overly stringent restrictions. However, the debilitating effects of 
government guarantees can travel quickly to the corporate sector and other financial firms 
reliant on banks, which are not directly under a bank regulator’s scrutiny or legal mandate. 
In PRC’s case, as a part of its fiscal stimulus, the Chinese government essentially employed 
its almost entirely state-owned banking sector to lend at large to the economy. From July 
2008 to July 2009, lending by the Chinese banking sector grew by 34%. While this has 
clearly helped the Chinese economy recover quickly from the effect of the financial crisis in 
the US—and its consequent effects on global trade—much of the growth in banking sector 
loans mirrors the growth in corporate deposits. In other words, loans are often sitting idle on 
corporate balance sheets, a phenomenon that is generally associated with severe agency 
problems in the form of excessive investments. While some of the “excess” may be 
desirable as part of the stimulus, especially if it is in public goods such as infrastructure 
projects, estimates suggest that the excess liquidity is also finding its way into stock market 
and real estate speculation. It is not inconceivable that such lending through state-owned 
banks would be reckless and sow the seeds of asset-pricing booms and, perhaps, the next 
financial crisis. The moral hazard is clear: PRC has bailed out its entire banking system 
more than once before, and at far greater magnitudes than the US has in the current crisis. 
The examples of India and PRC  highlight the classic risks that arise from government 
guarantees. First, they create an uneven playing field in banking sectors where some banks 
enjoy greater subsidies than others. This invariably leads the less subsidized players to take 
on  excessive leverage and risks to compensate for a weak subsidy, and the more 
subsidized players to simply make worse lending decisions given the guarantees. Second, 
government-guaranteed institutions are often employed to disburse credit at large to the 
economy, but this invariably ends up creating distortions, as the costs of the guarantees are 
rarely commensurate with the risks taken. The situation in India partly mirrors that in the US, 
where commercial banks enjoyed greater deposit insurance but investment banks did not; 
over time, investment banks expanded their leverage significantly, leading to their demise. 
Commercial banks suffered, too, but fared somewhat better because of their insured 
deposits. The situation in PRC is comparable to the massive credit expansion and risky 
betting that occurred on the balance sheets of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US.  
Both of these problems festered because of government guarantees and contributed to the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009. India and PRC should not rest on their laurels because of their 
rapid recovery from the latest global economic crisis. Instead, they need to safeguard their 
financial and economic stability by engaging in a rapid privatization of their banking 
sectors—or at the least, stop inefficient subsidization of risk  taking through state-owned 
banks. Government guarantees do not just weaken the banks that are guaranteed but also 
create systemic risk by weakening competing banks, subsidizing corporations, and fueling 
excessive asset speculation. 
5.3  Systemic Risk of Emerging Markets 
Our earlier analysis of systemic risk described various ways a financial institution produces 
systemic risk when it fails: counterparty risk, fire sales, and “runs.” One of the principal 
conclusions from that analysis is that systemic risk is a negative externality on the system 
and therefore cannot be corrected through market forces. In other words, there is a role for 
regulation in order to force financial institutions to internalize the external costs of systemic ADBI Working Paper 264    Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter 
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risk. The exact same analogy for financial institutions within a domestic market can be made 
with respect to international markets, and especially so for emerging markets. 
Even if a domestic regulator penalized a multinational financial firm for producing systemic 
risk locally, does this penalty carry through to all the international markets a firm operates 
in? In other words, should the penalty be more severe in such a case because failure can 
lead to systemic consequences elsewhere? The issue becomes even more complicated 
because financial institutions have an incentive to conduct  regulatory arbitrage across 
national jurisdictions, that is, if institutions are more strictly regulated in one jurisdiction, they 
may move (their base for) financial intermediation services to jurisdictions that are more 
lightly regulated. But given their interconnected nature, such institutions nevertheless 
expose all jurisdictions to their risk taking. Individually, jurisdictions may prefer to offer 
regulation “lite” (adopt a regulation “lite” structure) in order to attract more institutions and 
thereby jobs.  
In the current crisis, the poster child for being internationally interconnected is Iceland.
45
Of course, the most common source of systemic risk is a run. It is well known that, for many 
emerging markets, capital inflows are their lifeblood. There are numerous examples of 
capital flowing into new, emerging markets only to be suddenly withdrawn upon the 
occurrence of a crisis. These runs can leave the corporate and  banking sectors of the 
developing country devastated, especially if there are currency, liquidity, or maturity 
mismatches between the assets and foreign liabilities. An example from the recent crisis is 
that net private capital flows to emerging Europe fell from about US$250 billion in 2008 to an 
estimated US$30 billion in 2009. Not surprisingly, emerging Europe has been one of the 
hardest hit in terms of the impact of the crisis on its GDP and internal institutions. 
 
Iceland, a tiny country with its own currency, allowed its banking sector to grow almost 
tenfold in terms of foreign assets compared to the growth of its own GDP. Its huge leverage 
aside, Iceland’s survival was completely dependent on conditions abroad. The systemic risk 
of the three largest Icelandic banks (Kaupthing, Landsbanki, and Glitnir) also went beyond 
its own borders. Because the banks had fully exploited internal expansion within Iceland, 
they opened up branches abroad, particularly the United Kingdom and Netherlands, by 
offering higher interest rates than comparable banks in those two countries. When the 
Icelandic banks began to run aground and faced massive liquidity problems, in a now 
somewhat infamous event, the U.K. authorities invoked an antiterrorism act to freeze the 
U.K. assets. Essentially, Iceland as a country went into shutdown.  
The current crisis has been severe for both its financial effect (for example, a spike in risk 
aversion among investors) and economic impact (the largest drop in global trade since 
World War II). Therefore it is quite surprising that compared to past banking crises, emerging 
markets have gotten through largely unscathed. This can be attributed in part to better (or 
excess!) internal planning—having a substantial stock of international reserves—and partly 
to liquidity funding by international government organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. Both of these elements suggest an approach to 
international coordination that mirrors how one might regulate systemic risk domestically. 
Emerging markets need to coordinate with their larger brethren on prudent measures such 
as leverage limits and currency reserves. As a reward, these markets could access 
international lender of last resort facilities during a liquidity event and, in a systemic crisis in 
which there is a run on all financial institutions, employ loan guarantees and recapitalizations 
that are fairly priced and impose low costs on taxpayers. Of course, it would be necessary to 
shut down and resolve insolvent institutions to maintain the right incentives in good times. 
If national regulators can agree upon a core set of sensible regulatory principles, then the 
constraints imposed by such alignment would reduce substantially the practice of regulatory 
arbitrage through jurisdictional choice. The central banks could present their proposals with 
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specific recommendations to their respective national authorities, and seek consensus 
internationally through the Financial Stability Board or committee of the Bank for 
International Settlements. The lessons learned from this crisis should be an especially useful 
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